Engaging Jennifer

Guest Author: Meredith Garmon
Minister, Community Unitarian Church at White Plains

Editor's Note:
Thank you Jennifer and Meredith for engaging in this important and life saving conversation, and helping the rest of us think about this, and then act upon it.
Rev. LoraKim Joyner - First Principle Project Facilitator

My claims: Every being has inherent worth and dignity. Not every being has equal claim to our resources of care.

The principle of the inherent worth and dignity of every person does not mean that I am obligated to expend as much of my time and resources of care on my neighbors as on my family. (I do, in fact, take seriously our fourth source’s call “to respond to God’s love by loving our neighbors as ourselves,” but this doesn’t mean I generally spend as much time with them as I do with my family.)

Likewise, the worth and dignity of every being does not require equal distribution of my resources of care to each individual being. Dustmites have inherent worth and dignity, but I am not obligated to expend as much of my resources of care protecting individual dustmites as on pigs, cows, dogs, cats, chimps, dolphins, and blue and gold macaws.

In her post, “A Way Forward for Animal Advocates Who Would Campaign for a New UU Principle” (2014 Oct 28 - CLICK HERE), Jennifer Greene expresses doubts about the inherent worth and dignity of every being.

“As Wrong”

Part of Jennifer's position presents in terms of a dispute about “as wrong.”

“Do I believe it's as wrong to kill an ant, as a human? No, I believe it's far more wrong to kill a human than an ant.”

And she mentions, by way of contrast, Norm Phelps, who, “maintains that it's as wrong to kill an insect as a human.”

But disagreements about what is “as wrong” as what shed no light on the issue. “As wrong” is unnecessary – it doesn’t help the case for the principle of worth/dignity of every being. And “as wrong” is hopelessly ambiguous. When someone says "A is as wrong as B," they might mean

"The punishment for A should be the same as the punishment for B."

Or they might mean,

"A and B call for similar voicings of denunciation -- in the same way that we denounce stealing a candy bar as firmly as we denounce stealing a car -- though of course the punishments should differ, and the resources of law enforcement to prevent them should differ."

Or they might mean,

"It is true that A is wrong, and it is just as much true that B is wrong -- in the way that "$1 is money" is just as much true as "$10 is money.' Though $10 is certainly not equal to $1, the truth of the two statements is equal."

In the end, this "as wrong" talk should be regarded as merely a rhetorical flourish. We can affirm that all beings have worth and dignity without needing to advance any claims about equality of wrongness.

“Equal”

Jennifer helpfully mentions Mylan Engel’s distinction between “equal” and “mere” (or “nonzero”) considerability. “Equal considerability,” (EC) defended by Peter Singer and Tom Regan, says “we owe humans and sentient nonhumans exactly the same degree of moral consideration.” “Mere considerability” says “animals deserve some moral consideration, although not as much consideration as that owed to humans.” Mylan Engel, Jennifer, and I all agree that, as Jennifer puts it,

“it's not necessary to hold EC, in order to make an argument from consistency for the wrongness of even the most entrenched form of animal exploitation (i.e., the use of animals for food).”

While “inherent worth and dignity of every being” does not imply EC, notions of equality have sometimes entered the conversation. Jennifer references Mark Causey’s “Inherent Worth” (2014 Feb 20 -- CLICK HERE). Here’s Mark’s relevant paragraph:

“One of the most common objections I hear when presenting or talking about the First Principle Project is the objection that replacing the word ‘person’ with the word ‘being’ now means that we are all the same. ‘Does that mean that a tapeworm or a cockroach has exactly the same inherent value as a human being?!’ What I believe has happened here is that the objector has subconsciously inserted the word ‘equal’ into the formulation of the revised principle. What we are saying is that we are ‘called to affirm and promote the inherent worth and dignity of all beings.’ What the objector is hearing is that we are ‘called to affirm and promote the equal inherent worth and dignity of all beings.’ If every being has equal inherent worth, does that mean I can no longer swat a mosquito? But the First Principle project is not proposing to insert the word ‘equal’ into the principle. It is quite natural for us to hear the word ‘equal’ here because it is implied (although not explicitly stated) in the current wording of the principle. What we hear in the current first principle is that all persons, regardless of race, sex, ability, identification, etc., have equal worth and dignity. We are so used to fighting for the principle of equality amongst humans, as we should, that we automatically transfer this notion to the proposed changed wording including all beings.”

It’s true that the progress of morality among humans has been tied up with conceptions of “equality.” The language that emerged in Europe’s feudal period asserted that the landed classes were “betters” and “superiors.” Dismantling the lingering assumptions of that time were helped by insisting, “we’re all equal.” The work of ending discrimination continues to have a great need to invoke “equal protection of the law.” Whatever equality has meant – as a value and an ideal for human-human relations and for human institutions -- it has never meant that we expected anyone to devote the resources of their care just the same to everyone. We have always understood that people will be more devoted to their friends and family than to others. Equality has never meant the complete obliteration of loyalty.

So if people are, as Mark suggests, “subconsciously insert[ing] the word ‘equal’ into the formulation of the revised principle,” the problem isn’t that they are assuming the same kind of equality among animals that the current first principle now indicates among humans. Rather, the problem is that people may be – bizarrely -- inserting into the formulation of the revised principle a much stronger notion of equality than any kind of equality we affirm among humans.

Jennifer then says,

“But not everyone shares Mark's view. To others, ‘inherent worth and dignity of every being’ does imply equality.”

If there are, indeed, “others” who think this way, then let us endeavor to disabuse of them of their obvious mistake. I have already indicated the basic strategy: Almost certainly these “others” do not imagine that the inherent worth and dignity of every person requires equal energy of care to every person. So they cannot reasonably imagine that total equality of energy of care suddenly appears when we expand the circle of some care from “every person” to “every being.”

Speaking of Expanding the Circle…

Jennifer cites Rev. Karen Brammer’s post (2014 Oct 11 -- CLICK HERE). Karen says:

"I have difficulty increasing the reach of the first principle to non-human individuals when we have so much more intentional human bridge-building to do."

When we expand the circle of our care – expand the circle of those to whom we extend some care – it never damages those who were already in the circle. I don’t spend as much of my resources of care on my neighbors as on my family, but I nevertheless care about my neighbor. Doing so doesn’t harm my care of my family – in fact, I am better able to be present and loving to my family when I’m a generally kind person to my neighbors. Caring about, and building bridges of connection to people of a different human culture don’t harm my own culture, but strengthen it. In similar manner, caring about animals doesn’t detract from caring about people. Just the opposite. Whenever we expand the circle of care, the total “regime of care” is strengthened.

LoraKim Joyner’s post (2014 Dec 4 -- CLICK HERE) explained in some detail how helping nonhuman animals helps humans. Empathy and concern for nonhumans expands our capacity for empathy and concern for humans too. Karen’s concern for human bridge-building would rationally lead her toward, rather than away from, care for nonhuman animals.

The Prescriptive/Descriptive Thing

I made some of the above points to Jennifer in comments on Facebook. She said,

It is certainly a fact that we spend our time and resources of care more on certain individuals than on others. But when it comes to humans, we don't accept that as an argument against the idea of our "equal worth." "Equal worth" and "equality" are usually understood to be prescriptive, as opposed to descriptive. We say that humans are equal under the law—and the current first principle is widely understood to be a declaration of this egalitarian view. So I am worried that you are citing the descriptive fact of unequal allocation of time and resources of care (i.e., how things are), as if to disprove that which is prescriptive—i.e., how we think things should be, or the legal protections we agree should be applied to kin and strangers alike.

I replied by asking how she navigates the prescriptive/descriptive thing when it comes to humans -- while at the same time spending more resources of care on her own family. Whatever it is that is prescriptive about our notions of equality of all humans, it does not interfere with our sense that it is perfectly right and just to devote more of one's resources of care on one's own family than on one's neighbors. Jennifer replied,

"Well, I think we try to do that by building fairness and equality into our laws (in recognition of our instincts for things like preferential treatment and revenge)."

At issue here is, what difference does affirming the inherent worth and dignity of every being really make? What does it ask us to do differently? The answer is: we don't know. And it's just fine that we don't know. In the mid-1980s, when UUs adopted our principles, including the first one, we didn't know where affirming the inherent worth and dignity would take us -- but it was worthwhile to make that affirmation and see.

It's important that we start with description. The human rights community has broad consensus that the thing to say is the descriptive assertion, "people have rights" -- not "people should have rights." We assert a description of the moral landscape as the first move. Jefferson, in the Declaration of Independence, affirmed that all are created equal, endowed with inalienable rights. That was a moral description. Thirteen years later came the Constitution, where we sketched one of the many possible ways we might have understood ourselves as accommodating the moral reality. The Declaration inspired the Constitution, but didn't dictate any of it.

And that's the function of a descriptive moral principle -- to inspire. Out of that inspiration we may eventually come to agreement on some prescriptions. If, as Jennifer suggests, our present first principle leads us to try to build fairness and equality into our laws, that is just one of many directions we might have gone to accommodate the reality that all persons have inherent worth and dignity. That moral truth itself stipulates nothing about fairness or equality. (That's the 2nd principle -- and there's a reason these are two different principles rather than one.)

"All beings have inherent worth and dignity," is a moral truth, not a moral rule. The new, revised first principle would tell us to simply notice. In and of itself, all it prescribes is: notice that all beings have worth and dignity. The question will arise (at least, we hope it will), "OK, what do I do about this truth once I've noticed it?" The fact calls for some response, but in itself dictates no particular response. I think it will probably tend to encourage a greater conscientiousness and mindfulness in all our relations -- but different people will go different ways with it. When a community of people commits to observe (notice) a moral reality, as time goes by, particular action ideas begin to gain popular support. Animal cruelty laws might be strengthened -- and slowly expanded to more species. Or more efforts to preserve habitats may emerge. Consumer choices might gradually shift -- not because the revised first principle will tell people to shift them, but as a natural (and naturally highly variable) result of noticing, of having in mind the moral truth that all beings have worth and dignity. Some people might merely say a little prayer for the dustmites before turning on the air purifier that will kill many of them -- even that is at least a start. Some kind of start is better than none. And where that start might lead is anybody's guess.

However we respond, collectively recognizing the truth that all beings have inherent worth and dignity helps shift us toward life, connection, and greater joy in all we do -- whatever we do.

Experiencing the Inherent Worth and Dignity of All Beings

Reflections from Three Unitarian Universalists

Holly - A Cat

We had our beloved tabby cat Holly for 21 1/2 years.  For a number of later years, we followed a nightly ritual.  After supper, as I did the dishes, my husband would nap on the sofa.  Holly would jump up and join him.  After my settling in my chair opposite, Holly would raise an eyebrow, jump down and come over by me to jump in my lap.  Then we would read together, with stroking, for an hour or so.  If the portable heater was on, she would gradually stretch out fully, like a rag doll, across my lap.  I loved her so and miss her still, ten years next year. - Donna Estry

Tanya Tissues - A Dog

I once had a dog named Tanya Tissues. I was quite young then in what should have been my kindergarten years. My mother, her girlfriend and I lived on the streets of Sacramento. We were in and out of motels and drug dealers' houses, hospitals, and battered women shelters. We found Tanya Tissues in an abandoned lot - glued to the rear of a Rottweiler.... they had been copulating and seemed to have gotten stuck. She looked so terribly embarrassed and upset. My mother found a hose and blasted the dogs with water until they were able to separate. (I'm uncertain as to the logic behind this move, but in those days, my mom could do no wrong). Once the affair was over and the two were disjointed, Tanya followed me from then on out.

My mother was/is an IV drug addict and the company we kept was less than angelic. When she would nod out, or tweak out and vanish, Tanya Tissues was quickly at my side,  nudging my arm, whining until we would lie down and cuddle. When there were fights or I had been intruded upon by her 'Johns' or fellow using acquaintances, Tanya Tissues was always there to try and protect me or to comfort me afterward. She learned eventually, like me, that we had to sit quietly when violence ensued, or we would be included. So Tanya and I would go on glorious adventures through dumpsters and alleys and warehouses. You name it. She always started the lead by pawing at whatever door was keeping us in their company. 

I don't recall how I came up with the name Tanya Tissues. Perhaps because she acted as a tissue box for me in times of crisis? However, this is unlikely as I don't think I was that capable of analogy at that ripe age, but was rather quirky and imaginative, a trait we both learned would get us out of any fix.

Tanya Tissues eventually became swollen with what I imagined were her old friend, the Rottweiler's young. My mother said she would take Tanya to get an abortion and be back within a few days. I was later told that the abortion went badly and Tanya Tissues was in heaven with John Lennon (my favorite musician at the time). Ever since these events, animals, both real and imagined (imaginary pets), have held a higher status in my mind than any list of friends, family or species. - Tristan Paul

Trinity - A Dog. Sirius - A Cat. Animals on Farms 

A dog that I and a former boyfriend had adopted together died suddenly in an accident 2002. Our dog, Trinity, was only three years old at the time.  When my friend called me at work to tell me about the accident I was devastated.  I was too upset to stay at work and got a ride home.

After mourning for several hours I finally fell asleep.  When I woke up my newly adopted cat, Sirius, was curled up in my arms.  While he was an affectionate fellow, this was highly unusual and he had never done it before.  I truly feel that he knew I was grieving and had tried to comfort me at other times when I showed signs of distress.  His sensitivity to my emotions and desire to comfort I feel is dignified and very appreciated on my part.  

Our close connections with our companion animals who clearly show caring behaviors are just one way to experience the inherent worth and dignity of animals.  I've been vegetarian for almost 20 years, but fully opened myself up to the reality of the lives and deaths of farmed animals, so similar to the dog I grieved for and the cats that I love, and went vegan in 2010.  I feel that rejecting the commodity status of sentient animals is the greatest way I demonstrate that I witness the worth and dignity in other living creatures and to have a smaller environmental impact on the earth we share with humans and non-humans alike. - Sara Andrews

Inherent Worth versus Intrinsic and Extrinsic Worth - Our Principles Defined Part III

In the last section on "Our Principles Defined" we examined the meaning of inherent worth. The claim was that all individuals have inherent worth, no matter how others may value them.  Their mere existence grants them this worth. We accord this in part because as a religious people we experience reverence for life, as did Albert Schweitzer.   He claimed that all individuals have a will to live and as such, their life is sacred, for all of life is sacred and it flows through all.

There is a nagging concern to this approach because if all individuals have inherent worth, how then are we to apply ethical principles or make moral decisions if all lives have worth, and especially if they have equal worth?

I answer this in part by inviting one to imagine life on another planet that does not have humans. We would travel to such a place and as an impartial observer would find delight in the very smallest of microbes up to the most complicated social being.  All would be a marvel to us and we would experience reverence and awe that there existed life at all outside of earth with no enmeshment with human concerns.  We would be hard pressed to deny that each and every individual has inherent worth, for we could not easily discern the reasons to say this collection of molecules and processes has worth, and another not, or that some have more worth than others. Then imagine that we humans will colonize the planet. Once we enter the mix a strange phenomenon occurs.  We wish to strip away the worth from individuals because we know that they might have a negative impact on our life, or because we desire to use them instrumentally for our own benefit.  Perhaps we do this because we desire to act in ways consistent with our values, and desire principles to guide our actions and to simplify our lives.  Surely a being must have less worth if we use them, objectify them, and even harm them.  If they did not have less worth, then how could we ever justify what we do to them?

 This other planet is our planet Earth, and we have colonized it, not from arriving from outer space but by evolving.  When, on our path from one celled organism, to small rodent like mammal to hominid did the world suddenly and fundamentally change so that other beings did not have inherent worth? What did alter was that we became increasingly aware of how we valued others, and wished to communicate this with others of our kind so that we could build communities where life could prosper, mostly of the human kind.  We need to keep on this path of understanding how we communicate value so that life of all kinds has the best chance to prosper.

For that aim I suggest adding to our vocabulary when we talk about the Unitarian Universalist principles the concept of intrinsic value and extrinsic value. Both of these terms denote value that comes through a human filter, as opposed to inherent value which exists whether we are on the planet or not.  Intrinsic in the Merriam Online Dictionary means "belonging to the essential nature of a thing : occurring as a natural part of something." Intrinsic value then means value that derives from the nature of an individual, and can differ based on their experiences, particular genetics, and cultural influences (flock, herd, ecosystem influences).  We might then describe the intrinsic value of chimpanzees and whales as being quite different than that of amoebas or dust mites because of the differences in their subjective experience, and mode of operating and relationships within the web of life.  It is we humans who characterize this intrinsic value.

We also characterize extrinsic value, which assigns value based on whether something is good for something else. For instance, we might say dogs have extrinsic value because they are good for humans.  As social predators they help us hunt and guard our homes, and have a number of genetic adaptations that make them particularly good companions for humans. Dogs are good because they are good for us (extrinsic value) and also because they are well, just dogs (intrinsic value). Extrinsic value gives us room to say that not all dogs are good, and that dust mites are bad because they are not good for humans. These things we may need to say so we can know how to manage our lives around dogs that trouble us by biting and chasing, and mites to which our children are allergic.

 It is to the realm of ethics then that we assign intrinsic and extrinsic value, for we humans will always seek ways of thinking to explain, rationalize, and guide our behavior. There is a deeper understanding, however, that does not hinge on what we would make of life, and that is inherent worth. It is a transcendental claim on our part. We cannot explain it (as much as I have tried in this blog!), master it, or harness it for our own use, much as we cannot define God.  Inherent worth is that which calls us beyond our human imaginings, projections, and limitations into a world of mystery, reverence, beauty and awe. It is a compelling invitation to live humbly and to walk in all the ways of love along a path forward we have yet to discern, but for which we long.  As part of the First Principle, inherent worth makes explicit our vision of a world not yet obtained, but worth striving for, worth covenanting for.  For as we check our assumptions and ego rationalizations against a wondrous existence, we enter the undiscovered country where we and the many others may live well.

Rev. LoraKim Joyner, DVM

First Principle Project Facilitator

Inherent Worth - Our Principles Defined Part II

Today we look at the words inherent and worth in the First Principle.  First let us look at them separately. 

The Oxford Online Dictionary defines inherent in this way: "Inherent:   Existing in something as a permanent, essential, or characteristic attribute."

What does this mean in terms of human relationships with others?  No matter the species it means that another individual exists without being defined or judged by another. Instead they have inviolable characteristics with which they come into and leave this world.  Experiences, behaviors, and thoughts of themselves or others, do not impact the basic defining characteristics of what it means to be that individual.

The Merriam Online Dictionary defines worth as "the value of something measured by its qualities or by the esteem in which it is held." Dictionary.com defines worth in several ways, including, "excellence of character or quality as commanding esteem," and "usefulness or importance, as to the world, to a person, or for a purpose."  In all these cases worth is determined by something outside of the individual or species under consideration. It is a value given to one by another. 

When we combine inherent with worth, into inherent worth we come up with a strong statement about the existence of individuals. They have immutable value that does not change based on their experiences in their lives, the quality of life they lead, or the judgment of others. 

Tom Regan explains inherent worth in terms of the cup analogy (1).  Individuals are the cup, and for Unitarian Universalists, let's say chalice.  By being a chalice we are saying that individuals come into existence with worth that is not dependent on what might eventually fill the chalice, such as how humans might describe, value, or use them, or the kinds of lives they live.  A dog that attacks humans and cats with little provocation might be a different kind of dog from one that rescues mountain climbers or visits people in the hospital.  The individual dog's experiences and nature, and how others perceive her, is what we might pour into the chalice to describe this particular dog.  But by being a dog, she comes into this world as a sparking gem in the web of life, even though her lived experiences might be described in a range from dark coal to brilliant diamond.  There is no bad dog or good dog, all dogs are God's children.

No matter what, inherent worth means one's existence is a luminous chalice, a sign that each life is a beacon to guide us in living a life of reverence, full of beauty and awe. How each fills that chalice and what you do with it will vary, but know that you hold something precious in your hands.

Rev. LoraKim Joyner, DVM

First Principle Project Facilitator

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[1] Regan, Tom.  2004. The Case for Animal Rights: Chapter 7.

Inherent Worth

Today's Guest Author:  Mark Causey, M.Div., Ph.D  

Teaches Philosophy and Liberal Studies at Georgia College & State University

Member:  UU Congregation of Gwinnett (in Lawrenceville, GA).  

Board of Trustees UU Animal Ministry

Philosophically speaking, inherent worth is contrasted with instrumental worth.  For something to have instrumental worth indicates that it is valuable only as a means to an end.  Money has instrumental worth in this sense.  It is a means to an end (i.e. the things I can purchase with it).  Money has no value except its current exchange value for goods and services.  For something to have inherent worth means that it is valuable in and for itself.  An entity with inherent worth is an end in itself.  Our first principle (as it currently stands) concerning the “inherent worth and dignity of every person” is meant to call attention to the fact that [human] persons (the dictionary presently limits the term “person” to humans) are ends in themselves.  It is meant to prohibit our usage of persons as mere instruments, like tools and things, for our purposes.  In Kant’s formulation, we should always treat others as ends in themselves and never merely as a means to our own ends.  Each person is his or her own unique center of value.  Slavery was a denial of the inherent worth and dignity of the personhood of the slave.  The slave was a person reduced to mere instrumental value.  UUs rightly rejected this reduction of persons on moral grounds.  Of course the present first principle goes beyond merely prohibiting slavery in that it also calls us positively towards and attitude of respect for all persons regardless of the many differences that may exist between us.  I will address the issue of equal worth below.

The question currently being posed by the First Principle project is whether all beings, not just human beings, have inherent worth.  To answer this question in the negative and to reserve inherent worth for human persons only invites a further question: “On what grounds do we deny inherent worth to other beings?”  To reply on the grounds that other beings are simply not human is to beg the question.  It doesn’t tell us why humans, and only humans, have inherent worth to begin with. 

A large part of our inheritance from both classical western philosophy and our Judeo-Christian past is the notion of the hierarchy of values in terms of beings that Arthur Lovejoy dubbed the Great Chain of Being.  With God at the top and humans a close second (or third if you are a medieval theologian and count angels as second), then follow the animals, plants, and finally inanimate things like rocks and dirt.  It should of course be noted that even within the human category, there was traditionally also a hierarchy in terms of sex and race in which white males tended to count for more than women who counted for more than slaves and so on.  In Biblical terms this was cashed out through the Genesis story of the separate and special act of the creation of humans as distinct from the rest of creation.  But this worldview also belongs to the days of the geocentric universe, and few of us take the Genesis creation myths to be literal, scientific accounts of the origins of the universe.  This sort of hierarchical ranking of beings is out of touch with modern science.  Ever since Darwin we have realized that whatever differences exist between humans and the rest of the animal kingdom are differences of degree not differences of kind.  We all share a common biological ancestor.

But worldviews, especially when they favor our interests, are hard to change.  Humans have been set apart and above the rest of nature on the basis of intelligence (rationality), the possession of a soul, being moral, having language, and so on.  Indeed, Descartes went so far as to claim that only humans had minds and could feel pain.  Animals in his view were just very cleverly constructed automatons whose shrieks of pain as they were being vivisected were just so many squeaks of their cogs and springs.  Recent advances in our scientific understanding, especially the contributions of animal ethology and cognitive ethology, have largely discredited all of the above reasons given for human uniqueness.  True to Darwin’s early insights, recent science is continuing to blur the distinction between human animals and the rest of the animal kingdom.  The work of biologists and ethologists like Marc Bekoff, Jonathan Balcombe, Frans De Waal, and Jane Goodall has demonstrated a far greater degree of human/animal continuity than discontinuity.  These scientists, among many others, are challenging us to expand our understanding of non-human animals in terms of their amazing cognitive, emotional, and even moral capacities.

The moral point, however, is that whatever the real differences (of degree) between us, they are morally irrelevant.  Insofar as other animals are subjects of their own lives with, as Tom Regan observes, a biography not just a biology, they are not the sorts of things we can legitimately use as instruments for our own purposes.  Insofar as they have the capacity to experience pain and suffering the generally accepted moral harm principle states that we should never cause harm to another without a very good reason.  Because animals other than us also care about their own lives and their lives can go better or worse for them, they are very different from a tool fashioned for our use.  If human pain and suffering counts at all morally, then so does theirs.  There is no qualitative difference, no difference in kind.  As Jeremy Bentham famously noted: “The question is not Can they reason?, nor Can they talk?, but Can they suffer?”

The word being, however, can also include more than just humans and other animals.  It can also include other life forms like plants or fungi.  While these may not be sentient beings like us (so there is here a difference in kind not just degree) is there any reason to entirely exclude them from our circle of moral concern?  We do so at our own peril.  We humans are latecomers to the world.  As our seventh principle reminds us we are merely members of an interdependent web.  As Aldo Leopold formulates it in his famous Land Ethic: “A land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it...it implies respect for his fellow-members, and also respect for the community as such.”  The world into which we are born is much older, complex, and complete than we are.  We are just barely beginning to understand the complex balance and intricacies of our planet’s ecosystems, which through our ignorance and hubris we are rapidly destabilizing and destroying.  It is the height of hubris on our part to think that this world, billions and billions of years in the making, is simply raw material put here for our use.  But if we assign to the rest of nature only instrumental worth, that is exactly what we are saying.

One of the most common objections I hear when presenting or talking about the First Principle Project is the objection that replacing the word “person” with the word “being” now means that we are all the same.  “Does that mean that a tapeworm or a cockroach has exactly the same inherent value as a human being?!”  What I believe has happened here is that the objector has subconsciously inserted the word “equal” into the formulation of the revised principle.  What we are saying is that we are “called to affirm and promote the inherent worth and dignity of all beings.”  What the objector is hearing is that we are “called to affirm and promote the equal inherent worth and dignity of all beings.”  If every being has equal inherent worth, does that mean I can no longer swat a mosquito?  But the First Principle project is not proposing to insert the word “equal” into the principle.  It is quite natural for us to hear the word “equal” here because it is implied (although not explicitly stated) in the current wording of the principle. What we hear in the current first principle is that all persons, regardless of race, sex, ability, identification, etc., have equal worth and dignity.  We are so used to fighting for the principle of equality amongst humans, as we should, that we automatically transfer this notion to the proposed changed wording including all beings. 

Does acknowledging inherent worth in all beings necessarily mean equal worth?  After all, if all beings have exactly the same worth, what justifies my use of any being even for my own vital needs?  I would have no moral right to eat either a carrot or a cow.  I would have no right to cut down a tree to build my house.  Or take an antibiotic to cure an infection.  We would arrive at a moral dead-end in which no realistic action would really be possible.  Even the deepest ecological vision, Arne Naess’ Deep Ecology Movement, only proposes biospherical egalitarianism in principle allowing that “any realistic praxis necessitates some killing, exploitation, and suppression.”  All that the proposed principle change is asking is for a paradigm shift in our thinking about the more-than-human world—a shift away from anthropocentric instrumental value, towards an acknowledgement and respect for inherent worth.  It is a call to expand our circle of moral concern and compassion beyond the limits of our own species and to acknowledge the truth of our membership in the larger life community that has value in its own right.  It had value before Homo sapiens arrived on the scene and it still does now.

We will still have to make difficult decisions as our interests legitimately conflict with the interests of other beings.  We do this amongst equal humans all the time.  What is different about the acknowledgment of the inherent worth of the non-human world is that our human interests will not (or at least should not) always automatically win.  The world is not simply a stockpile of resources for our exploitation.  To assert that simply because humans can—and have—dominated the rest of nature that this justifies our attributing inherent worth only to humans is really just another form of the “might makes right” argument that we would rightly reject if applied in human affairs.  Any number of otherwise unacceptable acts could be justified on that argument.

The only way to justify the view that non-human nature has only instrumental value, would be to establish some way in which humans are separate from and independent of the rest of nature.  Such a view was once commonly held and its remnants are very much with us still (much like the view of white racial superiority was once commonly accepted and its remnants are still all too much with us still).  But such a view flies in the face of reason and science, and even our own deepest intuitions and feelings.  As a thought experiment try this.  Complete the following sentence: “Only humans can ______.”  Make sure you complete the sentence in a way that qualifies every human being and no other type of being.  For example, “Only humans can use language” won’t work because not all humans can use language (infants and severely mentally challenged people cannot and some primates and even some parrots can in a more robust way than simply repeating words or phrases).  Now ask yourself if whatever you filled in the blank with is a morally relevant characteristic.

This is not at all to deny that humans are distinctive in our advanced cognitive, linguistic, social, and moral capacities. But these differences of degree do not in any way correspond to superiority in value.  Difference here need not mean better—just different.  We do not treat more intellectually advanced humans morally as having more inherent worth than the rest of us.  We would not, for instance, condone the involuntary use of lower IQ human beings in painful medical experiments in order to find a cure for a higher IQ individual on the basis of IQ differences alone.  Animals and plants have capacities we do not possess.  We cannot echo-locate like a dolphin or a bat nor photosynthesize like a plant.  Humans are not the sole bearers of value. 

So how to decide when our interests conflict?  The Great Chain of Being makes it easy.  Humans win. Every time. But if we reject the notion of the chain in favor of an interdependent web, what can guide our decisions?  I would suggest that there are some morally significant factors to consider: factors like sentience (the ability to feel pains and pleasures), consciousness, and sociality.  Vital interests trump non-vital interests.  Living things have more at stake than inanimate objects.  It is hard to imagine doing a moral harm to a rock.  Easier to imagine harming a plant.  Easier still to imagine harming an animal or a human.  Conscious beings, animals human and non-human, have a sense of self that persists over time and interests in how their lives go.  Social beings have more complex capacities for relationships and experiences.  It means that a harm to a member of the society causes pain to other members.  For example the death of a social being also affects the others in that society who mourn their loss (humans are not the only animals to mourn our dead—elephants for one do so as well).  Is this just another Great Chain of Being worded differently?  I don’t think so.  There is nothing here to imply that humans must always come out on top.  For example, in the choice of whether to eat the cow or the carrot the cow gets greater consideration because of the morally relevant facts that cows are sentient, conscious, and social beings.  As Alan Watts wryly observed, he was a vegetarian because “cows scream louder than carrots.”  But what about the human’s interest in eating the cow (because they really like the taste of a good steak)?  It loses because the non-vital interest (taste preference) does not override the cow’s vital interest in remaining alive.  This blog entry is not the place to work out all the ethical issues (as if I could anyway).  My point is simply this: recognizing the inherent worth of other-than-human beings does not commit us to a moral dead end or an impossible practical position of non-action.  It simply requires us to recognize at a minimum that the rest of nature has value which does not depend on what use humans can put it to.  It simply asks us to make a more humble, as well as a more ethically, intellectually and scientifically defensible assessment of our place in the grand scheme of things.  Spiritually it calls us to expand our circles of compassion by opening our hearts and our arms to embrace the more-than-human world in which we live.  That’s all we’re really asking.