Gratitude for the
vision of this project
I appreciate the
invitation to share my ideas about how this project could move forward. In her
invitation, Rev. Joyner refers to "the essence of the change" that is
the purpose of this project. I thank her for this reminder (if I'm understanding
her correctly) that the intention which unites us is not mere bylaw amendment,
but of course personal and institutional transformation.
I am terribly excited
about getting UUs to hold discussions about widening our moral circle. These
discussions are so challenging, but so important.
Let me begin this post
by focusing on some of the questions currently posed by the First Principle
Project (FPP).
Two different
questions—one easier than the other
In its second
sentence, the sidebar at the FPP blog poses a profound question: do species
besides humans have worth and dignity?
Most UUs could surely
name some non-human species that they believe to be endowed with worth and
dignity. Just a single example is all that's needed to collapse the
"humans are the only ones" belief. For example, if the worth and
dignity of Coco the gorilla and her kin is evident to us, we need look no
further than her species in order to answer the question in the affirmative: yes,
species besides humans have worth and dignity.
The sidebar continues,
explaining in the very next sentence that the blog's essays will relate to the
question, "Does every being have worth and dignity?"
This question, whether every being
has worth and dignity, is quite a different question than the previous one.
This question is not about collapsing the
"humans are the only ones" belief. This question is asking if we can
draw the circle representing those-with-worth-and-dignity so wide that
it includes not just Coco, not just your dog or my cat, but every being.
This question raises more challenging questions. Is a sponge a being? What does
it mean for a tapeworm to have worth and dignity? And so on.
Is it clear, I hope,
why these are very different questions? On more than one occasion, I have
observed the conflation of the two; as if the proposed revision of the first
principle is about collapsing the "humans are the only ones" belief,
when in actuality the proposed revision is about asserting a far more expansive
claim: "the worth and dignity of every being."
Another hard question;
a common intuition versus bodhisattva-consciousness
Elsewhere, the FPP
materials pose this question: are you comfortable with this statement,
"…[humans] merit the same moral consideration as all [other
species]."
If you are a Buddhist,
or Hindu, or Jain, you might indeed be comfortable with this statement, since
Buddhist, Hindu, and Jain teachings promote this. (If my understanding about
this is wrong, I hope someone will correct me on this point.)
But even ethicists
known for challenging the hard line between humans and other-than-humans have
held that in lifeboat-dilemma scenarios, it's possible (some of them say it's
required) to give preference to a human's life over a non-human's life. [1] In
other words, even prominent pro-animal ethicists seem prone to the intuition
that humans may merit greater moral consideration than other species.
I do not know if this
intuition of unequal interspecies moral consideration will ever be eradicated
from human cultures in general. I wonder what kind of spiritual evolution it
will to take for most people to agree that it's as wrong
to kill a turkey, as a human; and that it's as wrong to
kill an ant, as a turkey. There are religions other than Unitarian Universalism
which already teach this, and there are individuals within the Unitarian
Universalist denomination who believe this. Am I one of them? Do I believe it's as wrong
to kill an ant, as a human? No, I believe it's far more wrong to kill a human
than an ant. I won't rule out the possibility of feeling differently someday,
but that's my present view.
While I don't believe
that killing an ant or turkey is as wrong as killing a human, my day-to-day behavior toward
ants and turkeys and other animals is the very same as Norm Phelps' behavior toward them, and Norm maintains that it's as wrong to kill
an insect as a human. How can this be, that Norm and I do not hold the
same beliefs about moral considerability across animal species, yet our
behavior is the same? What lessons does this hold for UUs who would campaign to
widen our moral circle?
The "mere
considerability premise" is enough
Philosophy professor
Mylan Engel, Jr. explores the differences between the equal considerability
premise (Norm's position) and the "mere" (non-zero) considerability
premise (my position) in his essay,"The Mere Considerability of Animals." Engel demonstrates that belief in the
equal considerability premise (EC) is "a stronger and more contentious
premise than is needed" to take a principled stand against animals'
exploitation and oppression. Engel shows that it's not necessary to hold EC, in
order to make an argument from consistency for the wrongness
of even the most entrenched form of animal exploitation (i.e., the use of
animals for food).[2]
Needless harm is
inflicted on, for instance, more than 8.8 billion birds by the United States'
poultry industry each year. If you think what explains this is people's lack of
belief in "moral equality" between birds and humans, then it makes
sense that you might see a need to push for adoption of the EC. But there's
another possibility: it could be that people don't need new belief in EC.
Instead, it could be that what's needed is for people to close the gap between
their presently-held belief (in the non-zero considerability of birds), and
their actions, which are not consistent with their own belief. This is the
essence of Engel's consistency argument.
One of the things I
appreciate about the consistency argument is that it promotes a profound
optimism about people's goodness. It expresses a confidence in the beliefs
people already have, in their core values of kindness, justice,
mercy and compassion. This strikes me as theologically very UU.
Does the FPP promote
EC, or not?
Mark Causey has argued
that the proposed revision to the First Principle is not attempting
to posit EC.[3] But not everyone shares Mark's view. To others,
"inherent worth and dignity of every being" does imply
equality. It's easy to understand why they think it does.[4]
I recognize that some
of us cherish the "inherent worth and dignity of every being" phrase.
I know that it's a personal credo for some. But to the extent that it's
interpreted as promoting EC, it triggers resistance in many UUs.
Let's reframe the
project
I'm sure that at this
point, I have not persuaded every last FPP supporter to abandon the dream of
changing the first principle. That's fine; I didn't expect to. I am simply
hoping to persuade you that a reframingof the project could be a
productive way forward.
Here's what I mean: we
could reframe this project as the New Principle Project, taking the position
that to keep up with the times, our principles ought to include acknowledgment
that sentience endows other-than-humans with moral interests, and that our
moral community ought to extend beyond our own species. We therefore need a new
principle. And then, rather than ask UUs whether they support revising the
first principle, yes or no, the question could be this: given our
need for a new principle, which do you favor—a revised
first, a revised second, an augmented seventh, or a new eighth?
If we ask a different
question, might we achieve our purpose better?
Rev. Brammer, in her
recent guest post to the FPP blog, wrote, "I have difficulty increasing
the reach of the first principle to non-human individuals when we have so much
more intentional human bridge-building to do." If we asked her to
tell us which approach to a new principle she would favor,
might we get a different answer? We might discover that a differently-framed
question would keep the door open to inter-movement solidarity.[5]
This project could
decide to seek the answer to this question:
In
light of our need for a new principle, which do you favor?
The inherent worth and dignity of every being (a revised first)
Justice, equity, and compassion in all our relations (a revised second)
Respect
for the interdependent web of all existence of which we are a part,
and for the interests of individual beings as well (an augmented seventh)
Respect
for the sentient creatures, great and small, who dwell with us on Earth. (a
new eighth)
What would be the
practical implications of turning the FPP into the NPP? The essays in favor of
revising the first principle would still be relevant resources, but the
conversation going forward would not be limited to the question of revising the
first. If I understand the conversation Rev. Joyner had recently with Jim Key, fifteen congregations must
all pass the same resolution concerning the bylaw amendment. The NPP I'm
proposing is compatible with that requirement.[6]
The
risk of lost opportunities, the cost to animals
I'm urging the
collaboratory to embrace this course adjustment because of the reactions I've
observed to the proposed first principle revision. I've seen non-vegans (and we
know the vast majority of UUs are still in this category) react negatively, in
part I think because the proposal seems too extreme—because "every
being" makes them think about tapeworms and dust mites, rather than the
chickens on their plates or the cows on their feet.
I know you've been
doing your best to address this, with thoughtful writings about the meaning of being,
and about the meaning of worth and dignity—but I'm
afraid the current wording will remain a stumbling block for many. The proposed
first principle revision reinforces their impression that those of us who are
animal advocates are rather different from them. It adds to their perception
that we're pushing an "extreme" agenda (possibly even an EC premise,
which, as I discussed above, runs counter to common intuitions about the moral
permissibility of giving human life preference over non-human life in cases of
true conflict).
If the only proposal
you continue to put forward is this first principle revision, there is a real
danger you will be contributing to this unfortunate notion that to be an animal
advocate requires profoundly different beliefs than the ones most people hold.
The impression some people have already taken away from their encounter with
the first principle proposal is that there's a considerable distance between
where they are and where FPP wants them to be, a chasm which may be so wide
they cannot picture themselves crossing it.[7] But if you reframe this project
now by also putting forward some possibilities which are more clearly
compatible with the mere-considerability position (which, I want to reiterate,
is the position held by myself, by prominent pro-animal ethicists, and by at
least some members of this collaboratory too), you'll mitigate the risk of
making such a counterproductive impression, going forward.
A more inclusive, more
productive way forward
If this project has
been conceived in order to foster personal and institutional transformations,
to lift up our obligation to recognize the interests of non-human beings, and
to expand our circle of compassion, then it seems to me a New Principle Project
as I've described here offers a way forward that could, possibly, be more
inclusive while not losing the original purpose of, or existing contributions
to, the First Principle Project.
[1] Schweitzer,
Singer, Regan, and Francione all hold that under the "equal moral
significance" premise, it's still possible (some of them would say
required) to give preference to a human's life over a non-human's life, in
lifeboat-dilemma scenarios.
[3] Mark writes:
"There is a fairly standard philosophical distinction that I think might
be helpful here. Moral philosopher, Kenneth Goodpaster, back in 1978 made a
helpful distinction between "moral considerability" and "moral
significance." Moral considerability is the question of whether an entity
should be taken into account morally *at all.* Moral significance is about *how
much* that entity is to be taken into account, It seems to me that what we are
asking here in terms of inherent worth and dignity is that we expand our notion
of moral considerability to include all beings. If we humans could just take that
first step it would be amazing and completely transformational! After we take
that first step, then can worry about the harder issues of moral significance
in light of the sorts of conflicting interest claims that inevitably occur in
life. It may be that we legitimately consider some entities as having more
moral significance than some others, but that should be predicated upon the
recognition that all possess moral considerability at least. It seems to me
that we sometimes get hung up in our discussions by wanting to rush ahead into
the thorny issues of moral significance before we have even taken the first
step of expanding our conception of moral considerability to all. To me,
inherent worth and dignity means at the very least having moral considerability.
I see no reason why moral considerability should be limited to just humans, and
I don't believe that in our heart of hearts we really believe it is that
limited."
[4] As Mark
notes in his "Inherent Worth" blogpost, it's
natural that many UUs will understand an implication of EC in the
inherent worth and dignity of every being. They hear
"equal" because the First Principle as it exists now
intends exactly that message of EC among humans.
[5] As justice activists, we need to ask ourselves: does it matter, the
ways that different forms of oppression mirror and interact with one another? Many of us think so,
and we've appreciated the perspective of pattrice jones,
for example, who explains that eating meat is something we do to someone else's body
without their consent, of A. Breeze Harper, of Jasmin Singer, of others who are making connections in
justice work, explaining why, for instance, dairy is not just an issue of
animal exploitation—it's an environmental issue, an issue for feminists, an
issue of race and ethnocentrism, too.
These activists say
that people doing various kinds of anti-oppression work need to be allies, and
inter-movement solidarity is important. Part of that work is unpacking our own
privilege(s), be that white or straight or male or cisgender or economic or
able-bodied or another form of privilege. Does being human in a multispecies
world call for some unpacking, too? Without a doubt.
[6] Congregations
could decide which of the following they want to pass:
a) We the (insert
congregation name) do hereby call on the General Assembly of the UUA to omit
"every person" and replace with "every being" in Article II
Principles and Purposes, Section c-2.1 Principles, Line 12, UUA bylaws.
b) We the (insert
congregation name) do hereby call on the General Assembly of the UUA to omit
"human" and replace with "all our" in Article II Principles
and Purposes, Section c-2.1 Principles, Line 13, UUA bylaws.
c) We the (insert
congregation name) do hereby call on the General Assembly of the UUA to append
", and for the interests of individual beings as well" in Article II
Principles and Purposes, Section c-2.1 Principles, Line 21, UUA bylaws.
d) We the (insert
congregation name) do hereby call on the General Assembly of the UUA to insert
"• Respect for the sentient creatures, great and small, who dwell with us
on Earth." in Article II Principles and Purposes, Section c-2.1 Principles,
after Line 21, UUA bylaws.
Just as FPP supplied
the precise wording for congregations to pass in support of the first principle
revision, the expanded NPP would supply the precise wording for congregations
to pass in support of the other possibilities (a second principle revision, a
seventh principle augmentation, or a new eighth principle). And it's
conceivable that more than one change could be passed by fifteen congregations.
This process would offer congregations more pathways to participation in the
conversation, and could stimulate more attention than the binary, yes-or-no
question regarding the first principle.
[7] I have found no
better description of the tragedy of this lost opportunity than the following
passage, written by Michael Greger in 2005 (this is an excerpt from his reflection for Satya Magazine in which he questions the wisdom of making a
big deal about honey avoidance):
It’s happened to me
over and over. Someone will ask me why I’m vegan—it could be a new friend,
co-worker, distant family, or a complete stranger. I know I then have but a
tiny window of opportunity to indelibly convey their first impression of
veganism. I’m either going to open that window for that person, breezing in
fresh ideas and sunlight, or slam it shut as the blinds fall. So I talk to them
of mercy. Of the cats and dogs with whom they’ve shared their lives. Of birds
with a half piece of paper’s worth of space in which to live and die. Of
animals sometimes literally suffering to death. I used to eat meat too, I tell
them. Lots of meat. And I never knew either.
Slowly but surely the
horror dawns on them. You start to see them struggling internally. How can they
pet their dog with one hand and stab a piece of pig with the other? They love
animals, but they eat animals. Then, just when their conscience seems to be
winning out, they learn that we don’t eat honey. And you can see the conflict
drain away with an almost visible sigh. They finally think they understand what
this whole “vegan” thing is all about. You’re not vegan because you’re trying
to be kind or compassionate—you’re just crazy! They smile. They point. You
almost had me going for a second, they chuckle. Whew, that was a close one.
They almost had to seriously think about the issues. They may have just been
considering boycotting eggs, arguably the most concentrated form of animal
cruelty, and then the thought hits them that you’re standing up for insect
rights. Maybe they imagine us putting out little thimble-sized bowls of food
for the cockroaches every night.
